

Kant, Lonergan and Intersubjectivity (Boston Draft 2007)

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The subjective is intrinsically open to intersubjective validation, if we avail ourselves of a method and procedure for doing so.¹

How might the intersubjective educational process itself become a vehicle of self-appropriation and of an understanding of the mind world relation on a shared group level? Involved will be a use of an introspective method whose procedure and results are also open to intersubjective verification.

Some of the most dramatic experiences of the awakening of an individual to a question or having an insight can occur in the classroom. A student can suddenly come alive in relation to a particular topic or equally, a teacher can in the course of teaching find him or herself challenged to understand better a topic which they are trying to present. All of these experiences are gold nuggets from the standpoint of self-affirmation but are usually quickly forgotten.

Insights are elusive: Definition of Elusive; difficult to find or catch; difficult to remember or recall. So if we don't go out of our way to notice them they slip by and with them our sense of our concrete historically situated intellectual selfhood slips by.²

I

In the course of authoring *Lonergan's Quest* I found my self drawn, among others, into two major challenges.³ Firstly, there was the challenge to understand, from the perspective his emergent pure desire to know and related levels of consciousness, Lonergan's emergent narrative selfhood – its concrete and intelligible unity identity whole (situated historical existence) - at least up to the end

¹ *The View from Within, First Person approaches to the study of consciousness*, edited by Francisco Varela and Jonathan Shear, (Thorevton UK: Imprint Academic, 1999) 2.

² According to Joseph Fitzpatrick in his *Philosophical Encounters, Lonergan and the Analytical Tradition*, 192 H.W.B Joseph was very familiar with the elusiveness of thought: 'a man cannot catch a thought and bottle it; he must create it by thinking it, if he wishes to think about it; and the task will be found difficult while it is strange, and not altogether easy.'

³ *Lonergan's Quest, A study of desire in the authoring of Insight*, is currently on offer through Amazon.ca for CAN\$63 + shipping.

of the composition of *Insight*. Understanding that unimaginable desire as such involved in me a profound intellectual conversion, an opening up to an infinity – his spirit of inquiry - in the finitude of his life. I have come to understand that it is the destiny of this same desire in us to know God. Secondly, within that movement there was the challenge to understand Lonergan's response to Kant's Copernican revolution which he considered posed a perfect question but whose answer was totally flawed. That question had to do with the structure of the relation between the conscious cognitional powers of the human mind and the world that they come to make known and present to the knowing subject. Kant, with his position on the immanence of understanding and reason, introduced a chasm between the world of the senses and the inner world of the mind. Both of these dimensions have some profound insights to offer in the realm of human anthropology and especially consciousness studies.

Because of this creative potential, in the aftermath I have found myself challenge to enlarge my understanding of the project, and this in two ways. To unlock the great contribution of Lonergan's insights there is a need to integrate Kant's problem and Lonergan's solution to it into both the movement of our lives from childhood to old age and into the dialogue of our lives with others.

For our mind world relation is not something static and fixed but rather something that is constantly changing throughout our lifetime from our elementary education as children, through our entry into High school, University and after. There are the differing mind world relations and contexts of the child, early, middle and late adult. The state of Lonergan's mind-world relation in 1926 when he was drawn into the Kantian problem was totally different from that which had emerged when he had finished *Insight*. Similarly for his later *Method in Theology*. So in the life of an individual the mind world relation is constantly changing through the learning and research process.

Self affirmation should then be understood as an assimilation of a invariant norm of life long learning in us, a norm which articulates what it is to live authentically throughout one's life. But as the invitation is presented there is something solitary about it. It is addressed to an I, not to an us. Our world also includes other subjects with whom we can live in a spirit of dialogue.

Within the limits of the present paper I want to suggest an experiment by means of which we might explore these problems, not only in the manner of the personal invitation offered to the reader of *Insight*, but also in the context of the intersubjective educational process in which we are all

involved in the presence of our dialogue relations with Others as well as with the topic being studied.

II The direct and the introspective modes of knowing

From Lonergan's essay in 1943, 'The Forms of Inference,' it is clear that he wished to develop a science, with its related method, of the data of consciousness.⁴ In the second *Verbum* article we find the remark:

We know by what we are. We know that we know by knowing what we are; and since even the knowing in 'knowing what we are' is by what we are, rational reflection on ourselves involves a duplication in ourselves. (CWL 3 *Verbum* 100, (90); also *Lonergan's Quest* 175.)

This quote contains in a nutshell Lonergan's later solution to Kant's problem. The same mental operations, questioning, understanding and judging are involved in spontaneously knowing facts in the world, and introspectively, in coming to know ourselves as the subjects of that knowledge. One and the same questioning wonder in us comes to know within being the distinction between the subject and object of knowledge.

The methodology involved is more clearly articulated in his Notes for his course: Intelligence and Reality.

Direct und(erstanding) : sensible data :: introspective und(erstanding) : data of consciousness
No difference qua understanding; Begin from experience of understanding; relate to inquiry, presentations, concepts, in process of maths, class(ical) phase, statist(ical) phase. identity of experimenter, experimented on, experimentation⁵

Surprising for those familiar with the empirical sciences is the comment about the identity of the experimenter, experimented on, and experimentation.

⁴ *Collection*, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd 1967) Also highly significant is his fourfold use of the term, insight in the opening pages of that essay.

⁵ "Intelligence and Reality," 9, para 5 (LRIT LB 131.5). In *The Question as Commitment*, 33 he puts it: You have to become accustomed to insights by setting yourself problems. For example: why does taking a square root work? When you see why it works you'll have an insight;

In the first or direct mode of knowing through our common sense and scientific questions, insights and judgements in relation to the data present to our senses our knowledge expands and with it more and more of the world becomes known. Although Lonergan focuses on particular aspects of the direct mode of knowing, the mathematical and scientific, for most of us the direct mode of knowing is immersed in the details of the lifetime of our situated historical and cultural existence. Within that situatedness the intellectual pattern of experience emerges significantly within the educational process. The spontaneous use of our mental powers involved can be so taken for granted that most don't think about and are not interested in them. The suggestion that they are a source of a profound and mysterious questions about what it means to be human can be met with hostility. Engaging in the introspective mode of knowing involves breaking down such resistance and one way of addressing this might be to integrate it into the actual educational process. Associated with the introspective mode we find:

- The direct mode of knowing is the data of the three basic questions of the introspective mode: what am I doing when I am knowing; why is doing this knowing; and what do I know when I do it? This connection should never be severed.
- What is meant by introspection is anything but self evident, as borne out by Lonergan's remark that you can't have insights into insights, only into phantasms. The awarenesses that comprise the data of consciousness are unimaginable.
- Although related, the languages that are associated with the two modes should reflect more clearly the differences in the data they are reflecting.
- Even those who think they take the introspective mode seriously can themselves suffer from degrees of blindness, truncation of the self and a large existential gap. Practice makes perfect.
- Contra Kant – Knowledge by Identity/Presence. Through our understanding objects in the world become immediately present to us. As the sounding of the bell causes hearing in us, so the intelligibility represented in the phantasm causes the act of insight. Our understanding is not immanent in oneself. Equally, our desire to know is not internally self starting. It has to be called out of itself by problems in the world. All of which deconstructs Kant's immanentism.
- The role of memory and description in the introspective mode.
- The need to keep a written record of the experimentation as in the natural and life sciences.

III – Extending introspective method from the subject-world relation to the intersubjective

So how might the previous methodology and related exercises be more directly incorporated into the intersubjective educational process itself? How, through that incorporation might it better facilitate self-appropriation, with its problematic dimension of introspection, on a ongoing and group level? There are, I suggest, hints and pointers in Lonergan's treatment of truth, its expression and subsequent reinterpretation in Chapter 17 of *Insight*, and Chapter 13 on the principal notion of objectivity with its three judgments.

Chapter 17 and intersubjectivity

Consider then the problems involved in a creative individual expressing and communicating the content of his new insight to his contemporaries. The subjects of new and original insights, Socrates on virtue, Aristotle on the soul or psyche, Einstein on relativity, Francis Crick on the genetic code, have to find some form of linguistic expression within the available social categories of communication. In some instances, paradigms shifts such as in Einstein's theory, there will be involved a rupture in their use. This points to the enormity of the problem of communicating new insights to others in terms of the current language use. Similarly the later teachers of the original insights of an author will themselves have to assimilate those insights and express them for their later audience.

Consider in this context the following quotes:

...an expression is a verbal flow governed by a practical insight (F) that depends on a principal insight (A) to be communicated, upon a grasp (B) of the anticipated audience's habitual intellectual development (C), and upon a grasp (D) of the deficiencies in insight (E) that have to be overcome if the insight (A) is to be communicated.⁶

What is significant here is that the analysis is not trying to elicit an insight of one's own in response to some posed problem as in the earlier quote on method: rather there is involved in it the problem of the communication of insights from the mind of one individual through the communication process to another. It could be a great scientific discovery such as Crick and Watson's into DNA or the genetic code or Mendel into the laws of genetics but more concretely, it occurs in the educational process all the time.

⁶ Ibid., 585 (562).

The teacher as a mediator through interpretation and communication of such past achievements for a later generation has, for Lonergan, to assess the state of intellectual development of his pupils and bring it into play in his communication. To him we can apply Lonergan's further remarks:

By an interpretation will be meant a second expression addressed to a different audience. Hence, since it is an expression, it will be guided by a practical insight (F') that depends on the principal insight (A') to be communicated, upon a grasp (B') of the anticipated audience's habitual intellectual development (C'), and upon a grasp (D') of the deficiencies in insight (E') that have to be overcome if the principal insight (A') is to be communicated.⁷

What I would like to suggest is that in the actual performance of this task there is being generated an intersubjective community of learning who are sharing the experience of being awakened by certain questions that arose in the minds of others and of trying to assimilate the insights which have emerged in their response to them. From that interpretative perspective they have, as mediators/teachers, the challenge of re-expressing them in terms that are comprehensible to their contemporaries. The dynamic of this experience with its related intersubjective group could, I believe, be most useful in the movement towards self-affirmation.

The intersubjective significance of language and mind/insights

The emphasis placed on the relation between insights and their linguistic expression in intersubjective communication opens up a question about the relation between language and mental operations:

The interpenetration of knowledge and expression implies solidarity, almost a fusion, of the development of knowledge and the development of language. Words are sensible: they support and heighten the resonance of human intersubjectivity; **the mere presence of another** releases in the dynamism of sensitive consciousness a modification of the flow of feelings and emotions, image and memories, attitudes and sentiments; but words possess their own retinues of associated representations and affects, and so **the addition of speech to presence brings about a specialized, directed modification of intersubjective reaction and response**. Still, beyond the psychology of words, there is their meaning. They belong together in typical patterns and learning a language is a matter, first, of grasping such patterns and, secondly, of gradually allowing the insights, by which the

⁷ Ibid., 585 (562).

patterns are grasped, to be shortcircuited by a sensitive routine that permits the attention of intelligence to concentrate on higher-level controls.⁸

Significant is the distinction between the psychology and meaning of words. Speech adds something to physical presence, an intellectual presence between speaker and listener, of mind to mind?

Two dimensions of and attitudes to language stand out in this context. Firstly, there is the ordinary use of language in describing situations in our world. Through that use we can communicate with others about such situations in our worlds. The language communicates to us what they are thinking about their worlds. Secondly, there is a use of language whose meaning directly discloses to us the mind of its author. It will refer, not to their weight or height but to their questions or problems, their state of confusion, their subsequent aha experiences and their consequences in relation to dealing with the problem, their false starts on a solution, corrections, and eventual resolution. If we correctly understand the meaning of such language we will, by the theorem of identity, gain direct access to the mind, or more broadly, the mind-world relation of its author. When an author articulates their questions they are telling us something about their mental state. Similarly, any time an author uses the word, insight, in their text they are again telling us something about their mental, or more broadly, their mind-world relation or state. Both their insights and questions relate them to their worlds.

All language, in its propositional dimension, is an expression of the thoughts thought by its author about the world of the direct or introspective mode. In this sense what I am writing at the moment is a verbal expression of what it is I am thinking. Correctly to understand the meaning of the propositions involved is to understand something about the thoughts thought by their author and their related world.

IV An Intersubjective Educational Experiment

In the light of the preceding suggestions consider the following scenario which could be considered as a complement to the pedagogy of the early chapters in *Insight*. You are a member of a group seminar taking a course in biography, one segment of which deals with the life and work of

⁸ Ibid., 577 (554).

Martin Heidegger.⁹ It has been pointed out that biographers are concerned, not with the what or why question which is concerned with ‘the nature’ of a human being, but rather the who question, which is concerned with historically situated existence, specifically who is Martin Heidegger? What knowledge can we have of him, even how well can we know him?

a. learning some worldly facts about the other

The material for the segment includes David Farrell Krell’s ‘General Introduction: The Question of Being,’ Safranski’s Biography, *Martin Heidegger, Between Good and Evil*, Heidegger’s letter to Bill Richardson, and a BBC Horizon Documentary Video, ‘Martin Heidegger: Human, All too Human.’ In the course of watching the video you see shots of his birthplace, Messkirch, including one of Heidegger as a child accompanied by a wonderful remark about his character by Gadamer. Further photographs follow of his stern and silent father and his more humorous mother, of his brother along with an introduction to the church where he served mass. There follows photographs of Husserl, Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers with appropriate commentary. The stages of his education are sketched, and his career as a lecturer leading up to the publication of *Being and Time*. This is followed by a segment on his later tragic political involvements, their consequences, Jaspers and the denazification procedures, and some remarks about Holderlin and the later Heidegger.

Through Krell and Safranski you come to understand the great influence on his life exerted by Grober, including his gift to Heidegger in 1907 of Brentano’s *The Manifold Senses of Being in Aristotle*. You also learn about his question, inspired by Brentano and Aristotle about what does it mean to be. Out of that question in time his book, *Being and Time* grew. In the video documentary you are taken into his hut in Todtnauberg where he wrote most of his major works, including *Being and Time*.

On this basis, without any real personal effort, but rather through the mediation of the teachers involved you come to the conclusion: I know the above facts about the life and times of Martin Heidegger. You understand the facts in the world which the proper names involved and related language refer to and so forth. But you might be puzzled by the question at this point: what do you mean by ‘I know X’ both in terms of its content and act. Of knowing. How did you come to

⁹ The actual content of this thought experiment is not written in stone. Clearly it will suit some audiences and not others; some will prefer a scientific biography, others a literary figure. And the content does not have to be biographical. But I believe it is always possible to choose a suitable educational content for groups of different ages and educational stages.

know these facts? Effectively you have been told them by someone else rather than finding them out for yourself. And yet you have made the judgment: I know the following facts about the life and times of Martin Heidegger. At this point the director of the seminar poses the question: How would **you** go about finding out similar facts about another biographical subject unknown to you; Wittgenstein or Einstein or Edith Stein? Well, how? It is important to think about this for a while before referring to the footnote below.¹⁰ It might also occur in such a pursuit that occasionally you get things wrong and find you have to backtrack before you get the right answer to a particular question. Although there may be disputes over certain facts, there are others that have achieved the status of an absolute.

b. learning some facts about the mental life of the other – the genesis of their question

After viewing the documentary video with its brief introduction to *Being and Time* the seminar director invites the group to read in parallel Krell's 'General Introduction: The Question of Being' and the letter of Heidegger to Bill Richardson quoted below:

You have in mind the fact that the first philosophical text which I worked my way, again and again from 1907 on, was Franz Brentano's dissertation: *On the Manifold Sense of Being in Aristotle* (1862). On the title page of his work, Brentano quotes Aristotle's phrase: I translate: "A being becomes manifest (se. with regard to its Being) in many ways.

Latent in this phrase is the question that determined the way of my thought: what is the pervasive, simple, unified determination of Being that permeates all of its multiple meanings?

This question raised others: what, then, does Being mean? To what extent (why and how) does Being unfold in the four modes which Aristotle constantly affirms, but whose common origins he leaves undetermined?

One need but run over the names assigned to them in the language of the philosophical tradition to be struck by the fact that they seem at first, irreconcilable: Being as property, Being as possibility and actuality, Being as truth, Being as schema of the categories. What sense of Being comes to expression in those four headings? How can they be brought into comprehensible accord?

¹⁰ The answer must be, following Collingwood on the logic of question and answer, by letting all the relevant questions about the person involved arise and pursuing and answering them.

This accord cannot be grasped without first raising and settling the question: whence does Being as such (not merely beings as beings) receive its determination?

The director points out that this passage is about the genesis, the awakening of Heidegger's core life interest in a particular problem in philosophy. On the basis of a reading of this passage, supplemented by Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Book IVf, you could come to the conclusion: the question that obsessed Heidegger for very many years between 1907 and 1927 is to be found in the second paragraph above. It poses for us the question: what do you think it was like for Heidegger to have that interest awakened in his life? How did it impact on his life?

In this move the group has been shifted from questions about Heidegger's public persona to questions about his conscious mental life and its relation with his proportionate world. The director invites the members to write a few sentences in their course journal about it. This leads to a further invitation to reflect on this notion of a beginning of a work in our own lives. In its own way it puts before us the question about the genesis of our own interests. So the next invitation is to write a few sentences in your journal about the awakenings of your own interests. At the conclusion of these writing exercises the group is invited to share and discuss the issues that are being opened up. What sort of knowledge is now forthcoming about the genesis of Heidegger's question; about the genesis of some interests and related questions of my own?

- c. learning further mental facts – understanding the expansion of Heidegger's beginning/ mind world relation, and of Heidegger as the evoker of questions in himself and others

Through a reading of Krell's introduction in parallel the group members come to a further appreciation of the mind of Heidegger in its pursuit of his question and as experienced by those who attended his early lectures.

With him, lecturing as such became something new altogether: it was no longer a "course of instruction" from a professor who devoted his real energies to research and publication. With Heidegger, book-length monologues lost their usual preeminence. What he gave was more. It was the full concentration of all the powers – powers of genius – in a revolutionary thinker who actually deemed himself to be startled by the intensity of the questions growing more radically in him. The passion of thinking was so complete in him that it communicated itself to his listeners, whose fascination nothing could disturb. ... Who of

those who heard him then can ever forget the breathtaking whirlwind of questions he unleashed in the introductory hours of the semester, only to become wholly entangled in the second or third questions...

Is it the case that the participants in the courses are encountering something like an infinity at work in the finitude of a human person, their teacher without understanding it as such and its significance? Through her experience of this intensity of questioning Hannah Arendt remarked that

“Thinking has come to life again; the cultural treasures of the past, believed to be dead, are being made to speak, in the course of which it turns out that they propose things altogether different from the familiar, worn out trivialities they had been presumed to say. There exists a teacher; one can perhaps learn to think.”¹¹

But does this pose questions about the undisciplined unleashing of the desire to know in the human mind given that we have no guarantee that it will not lead us into a cul de sac?

Again the invitation was put to the group: how would you gain access to this process of the expansion in a person’s life of a core intellectual or other interest. What do the above passages communicate to you about this? Again the group were invited to put this in words. This, as before led into a further invitation to reflect on their own experience of the expansion of an interest in, for instance, writing an essay. How did they experience the combination of confusion, ignorance, darkness, and so forth combined with a searching for clues in authors here and there, all of which leads into a shared discussion.

d. learning further mental facts: Exploring Heidegger’s three insights¹²

¹¹. Compare this with Eric O’Connor’ reaction to Lonergan’s course: Thought and Reality. “What came through from him was that all questions could be asked and should be asked, that in fact one didn’t begin to learn until one began asking questions. This was a shock to anyone educated before 1945. Having those lectures didn’t become important as a theory. That is definite. It became important as an experience: the way you learned anything was by slow questioning. In those early lectures, he somehow gave us the sense that the world is open to explore -- because he is curious himself about anything, and explores it. Slowly, in the lectures, he gave us a little glimmer about the obvious next level of questioning: You ask whether you have understood a thing correctly or not.” *Inquiry and Attunement, Thomas More Institute Papers/81*, edited by Melbourne and Therese Mason. (Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1981) 1, 13, 15.

¹² What is also of interest in this context is the emerging regular use of the word, insight, in very many modern texts. The most recent translation of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*, for instance, for the first time included an entry in the index under insight. Many of the scientific authors I am reading at the moment, including Francis’s Crick *What Mad Pursuit*, use the word widely. In fact, in that book there is one of the best accounts of what it is like to have a major insight that I have come across in the entire literature. This visibility of the word, its growing usage in the wider

Finally, prompted by his remarks in his letter and Krell's further clues, the members of the group are invited to explore what Heidegger might mean by his reference to three of his insights:

Meanwhile a decade went by and a great deal of swerving and straying through the history of Western philosophy was needed for the above questions to reach even initial clarity.

To gain this clarity **three insights** were decisive, though, to be sure, not yet sufficient for the venture of analyzing the Being-question as a question about the sense of Being.

Dialogues with Husserl provided the immediate experience of the phenomenological method that prepared the concept of phenomenology in the Introduction to *Being and Time*. ... significance of the Greek words *logos* (to make manifest) and *phainestai* (to show oneself)

A renewed study of the Aristotelian treatises (especially book IX of the *Metaphysics* and Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*) resulted in the **insight** into truth as a process of revelation, and in the characterization of truth as non-concealment.

With the **insight** into truth as non-concealment came the recognition of the fundamental trait of *ousia* (essence) the Being of beings: presence.

A first question must be: what exactly might Heidegger be referring to in this use of the word insight? An unexpected moment of clarification in and through which one discovers a way forward in a problem that up to that point was insoluble? It seems that having these three insights enabled Heidegger to compose his book, there is involved an element of know how. What sort of conscious awareness accompanies the mental event of an insight? Are all such insights eureka or aha experiences. Or are they elusive, locatable, startlingly strange? As an act with which a certain kind of awareness is associated, what might that quality of awareness be like? Startlingly strange?

Insights for Heidegger are into something. What might that mean? A gestalt shift? An intuition by another name? An immanent inner act of the understanding? An act of the understanding that, following Aristotle is caused by the (linguistic) phantasm in the world which contains the elements of the problem? Is it the case that Heidegger's insights are caused by his reading of Aristotle's and

culture, in particular in books involved widely in the educational process, poses more directly the question, what do they mean by it?

other texts and in this sense are intentional rather than immanent? Do they also always give rise to some conceptualization of the solution to the problem?

But, you will add, for Lonergan such insights, which can be of many kinds, mathematical, scientific, common sense, philosophical, are a dime a dozen and many of them are bright ideas which simply do not measure up to scrutiny. How are such insights to be tested? How, for instance, would one test Heidegger's insight into truth as non-concealment or revelation, for which he uses the metaphor of a clearing in a forest. Clearly this needs to be tested against other views on the matter – Aristotle and Lonergan on the identity theory of the understanding, through which something which was 'concealed' in the phantasm/world becomes present; and Lonergan's later theory of understanding the virtually unconditioned in judgment. In and through these discussions the director invites the participants to articulate what they think might be the meaning of Heidegger's use of the word, insight.

This can open up to a further question for the members for they too have found their interests from time to time awakened by the challenge of an essay. As they read the material their questions can expand but they, like him, can get stuck and do not know how to proceed. Then, sometimes unexpectedly, they have an aha experience which gives them the know how as to how they should proceed. This experience can repeat itself a number of times in the course of writing an essay. (*Lonergan's Quest* narrates this same process in Lonergan's own life, from the awakening of his curiosity by his early introduction to Kant in 1926, to his later composition of *Insight* between 1949 and 1953.) In so far as it is possible as many of these experiences as possible are to be remembered and recorded. The record should show how they now enable one to continue with the writing as well as enlarging one's mind-world relation. This, again, leads into a shared discussion in which the different perspectives of the members on the matter will be expressed.

On the principal notion of objectivity in relation to a group dynamic

Lonergan's solution to Kant's problem of the mind world relation is given in his principal notion of objectivity and requires that we make, not just the judgment of self-affirmation but three judgements: X is the case (this is a typewriter), I am a knower (self-affirmation); I am not X.¹³ The purpose of the three judgments is understand the distinction and relation with being, the objective of the pure desire to know, between the subject and the object of knowledge. But as well as objects

¹³ In *Lonergan's Quest* I have pointed out that the judgment of self affirmation cannot be first: it has to be derivative of other judgments in the direct mode of knowing. It is also interesting that his first articulation of the three judgments was in terms of: I'm real; You're Real; I'm not you.

such as typewriters there are also in our worlds subjects of knowledge different from oneself who pose questions and experience aha experiences and who write and talk about them. About this he comments.

Finally, in so far as one can intelligently grasp and reasonably affirm the existence of other knowers besides oneself, one can add to the list **the** objects that also are subjects. (376)¹⁴

Is it not the case that in trying to understand the awakening of Heidegger's wonder, its expansion and subsequent search for insights one also begins to find that the processes one is trying to understand in him are also operative in oneself? Does not the group exchange and dialogue, with the emergence of surprising perspectives on the question and related insights, act as a support in this difficult enterprise? Can one now on the basis of this experiment, with reference to one's understanding of Heidegger's desire to understand and one's own engagement with it, **write down** and date one's own account of one's own three judgment of the principal notion of objectivity including the judgment of self affirmation. This can be followed by a discussion of the experience among the group and of the manner in which they find, or not, that it resolved the Kantian problem of the chasm between the subject and object of knowledge. Through the direct mode of our questioning we come to know objects and situations and so forth in the world of our senses. Through the same questioning activity operating in the introspective mode we come to know ourselves as the distinct subject who knows those situations.

¹⁴ Problematic is his subsequent assertion: 'Again, one may define a subject as any object, say A, where it is true that A affirms himself as a knower in the sense explained in the chapter on Self-affirmation.' We are knowers before we know how we know!