

PERSONAL HISTORIES AND THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE

William Mathews, S.J.
Milltown Institute

Theories of knowledge, like theories in general, presuppose some given or datum which they propose to understand or explain. Physicists are familiar with the phenomena of gravitational masses and their interaction in the world, which a theory of gravitation proposes to explain. Biologists are familiar with the distribution of genetic traits in organic populations in the world which a theory of genetics attempts to understand. Following this line it can be asked, what does a theory of knowledge in general or of scientific, historical or everyday common sense knowledge in particular attempt to explain? What is it that a theory of mental acts, of understanding and thinking for instance, relates to as its given. Various answers such as a conscious self, a subject, a knower, or a person could be given but what is meant is not totally clear.

The present article is concerned with some tentative explorations of the relation between a theory of knowledge and its data. It is a sequel to an earlier article which pointed out certain parallels in the Intensive Journalling programme of Ira Progoff and Lonergan's invitation to self-appropriation.¹ Progoff's process meditation is concerned with helping an individual to get in touch with the elements of his own personal wisdom or spiritual history. It presupposes a general life context story from which it emerges and to which it returns and reorientates. Self-appropriation is of the form of a personal wisdom story in that its goal is to come to terms with the truth of how it is in any instance we come to know something in the world. It presupposes developed and continuing intellectual activity in everyday common sense living, science and scholarship. From the present standpoint it can be suggested that this amounts to the presupposition of a personal intellectual history as 'given' but not written up. It emerges from that personal intellectual history and in returning, reorientates it.

If self-appropriation, or more generally, philosophy of mind is based on such a presupposition then much will be gained by bringing it out into the open. The first part of the article will offer some tentative reflections on the notion of a personal intellectual history. The second will relate it to self-appropriation and theories of knowledge. The third will be concerned with the manner in which journalling techniques such as those of Progoff could assist the task of recovering the main features of one's personal intellectual history in a manner that will help self-appropriation.

1.

What then is the given which a theory of knowledge sets out to understand? Socrates as is well known was characterised by an intense desire to find out universal definitions of wisdom, courage, piety, virtue, and so forth. No one can really participate in the

Socratic pursuit unless he too allows his own passion to find things out to emerge. But no amount of pursuing definitions of wisdom or courage and so forth would amount to an objectification of the mental desire which tacitly drives the pursuit forward. The involvement of some unobjectified mental operations remains a presupposition of the whole enterprise. The same holds true when we move from the Socratic pursuit to attempting to find out what it is that is happening in our everyday common sense worlds. What we seek is again only made present to us through an unavoidable use of our own minds, through wondering and trying to find things out. The point is dramatically illustrated in the opening scene of Arthur Miller's *Death of a Salesman*.² Willy, Linda's husband returns home from work early and unexpectedly. Spontaneously she desires to find out why this is so and asks him, 'what happened?' It seems that we have no access to the meaning of the strange behaviour of our associates or family other than through wondering, suddenly understanding, and thinking about it. Equally we have no access to a scientific explanation of our world or to historical knowledge of our past other than through a use of our own minds.

Our own mental operations are a condition of possibility of all common sense, scientific, and historical knowledge. Through their operation we gain access to and come to live in the properly human world. But because they are such a presupposition no accumulation of everyday, scientific, or historical knowledge will amount to an objectification of them. Where Wittgenstein remarked that 'I am at the limit of 'my world' so we could hold that our own mental operations make situations or objects in the various worlds known to us but in doing they do not become known themselves.³ They are not objects in those world like gravitational masses of organic populations. It is this fact which gives rise to the unique problems associated with the relation between theory and data in the theory of knowledge. To answer the question, 'what is happening when I am coming to know objects in the world?' involves going beyond the horizons of science, common sense, and scholarship. It involves making the conscious dimension of one's own mental activity as involved in those realms a datum of questioning interest.

The question of self-appropriation is then an invitation to make the cognitive presuppositions of science, common sense, and historical knowledge explicit. But the problem does not limit itself to any particular instances of coming to know something in the world. Through recurrently using our mental capacities and coming to know different objects in the everyday, scientific, and historical worlds, each individual tacitly 'writes' his own personal intellectual history, his tacit intellectual autobiography.⁴ As so constructed it is 'given' but not yet written up, objectified. It is in fact the referent of the written up autobiography. Until it is objectified in an autobiography in a sense it is not yet known.

That personal mental history as given is peculiarly comprehensive. Any effort, intellectually, to escape from it is revealed upon reflection to be a part of it. It includes our education through which the human spirit of wonder and inquiry is introduced to a wide range of possible fields of intellectual interest such as languages, mathematics, science, technology, history, business studies, and the humanities. That education is education into a social group and culture, into their fields of interest and methods of investigation. Through it and some times in spite of it, life's intellectual interests develop. Out of the total spectrum of possible fields of interest the individual begins to narrow down the possibilities. He might become interested in one science rather than

another, in biology rather than in physics. He could become interested in one department of engineering rather than in another, or in one field or period of historical studies rather than another. Equally in his life world his intellectual interests could specialize in what Schutz terms certain 'zones of relevance' rather than in others.⁵ The story of slow emergence and shaping of such interests can be full of chance factors.

In the more adult stages of our intellectual histories we can move from various fields of interest to more specific investigations. Instead of being interested in biology, we become interested in some specific investigation, be it in genetics, developmental biology, or whatever. Most investigations or problems in life, as Collingwood has drawn to our attention, are not simple questions but rather complexes of questions and answers.⁶ Initially we are apprentices to the investigation and its contours are extremely vague. We have slowly to serve our apprenticeship, begin to discover relevant sub-questions in the investigation and reject irrelevant ones.

Thus it was that initially Watson had, while a senior at college, a vague but quite unfocused desire to find out what a gene was.⁷ As his desire unfolded he had to become familiar with the appropriate data and discover all the relevant sub-questions in the investigation. Does DNA crystallize? What sort of crystals does it form, helical? If helical, how many helices are there and how are they intertwined? If two how are the bases arranged, outside or inside the helices? The relevant sub-questions were not there at the start of the investigation. They had to emerge spontaneously in time. They do not emerge in a vacuum but only in the process of becoming more familiar with the data of the problem. In pursuing such sub-questions he had to master the experimental method of X-ray diffraction analysis of crystals. In the unfolding of the problem there were many frustrations, moments of being stuck or of finding himself in a blind alley. There were moments of luck and other occasions when part of it all seemed to come together, only to disintegrate under the scrutiny of critical questioning. Finally there is the moment when all the elements of the problem suddenly fall into place and critical scrutiny can find no loophole. So Collingwood's dictum and the actual temporal unfolding of the problem of understanding the gene illustrate very general features of the human performance of problem solving or of pursuing an investigation. As such they cast light on how it is that in our lives we spontaneously construct our personal intellectual history.

At the successful term of one particular investigation, the result can in turn become an element or sub-question in a further and wider problem. Once the structure of DNA was established it became an element in the wider problem of understanding the genetic code. Development can be interpreted as a repetition of the basic pattern of investigation in ever wider problem contexts. Repeating it involves moving to ever higher viewpoints. Alternatively an individual's or societies' interests can change and with that change there can come about a change in the selected fields of investigation.

Problem solving is not the prerogative of scientists and scholars. It is also a central feature of everyday common sense living. An individual or family have to resolve such common sense problems as, how can I or we live on such and such an income? Until they have reached some understanding there is a sense in which they cannot intelligently go on, continue, and project their life forward.⁸ More personally parents can spontaneously wonder about and try to understand the behaviour of their children. And of course, children can do the converse. Experiencing the everyday ups

and down in domestic intersubjective living invites us to wonder about and try to understand human behaviour.

In the early stages in Ibsen's *The Doll's House*, Nora takes the way in which Helmer relates to her for granted.⁹ However the experience of a crisis between them forces her to pose a number of very basic questions such as, is his relation to me the expression of love or of selfishness? Granted that, what are my sacred duties? We could also imagine such further relevant questions as, is Helmer going to change in his relation with me? Can I be human if he continues to treat me as he has been doing? We could also imagine questions which Helmer should raise or might be frightened to raise concerning himself and his relations with his wife. Here again we find that life's problems are really complexes of questions and answers. To resolve them properly we have to allow all the relevant sub-questions to emerge and be answered. How they are answered is also intimately related to how life continues. In many cases, until they are answered the people involved could be stuck, unable to 'go on'. Prospective answers to such problems, no less than those to scientific problems invite the scrutiny of critical reflection. The investigations which emerge in response to life's problems constitute major chapters in our personal intellectual histories as composed.

Our intellectual history is not, however, all sweetness and light. We can be in flight from life's questions. As Arthur Miller's *Death of a Salesman* illustrates, after a visit to Boston Biff Loman was never the same again.¹⁰ He lay down. Many years later Charley, his College friend, put it to his father that something must have happened when Biff met him in Boston to bring about this change in his behaviour and outlook. But his father rejects out of hand the significance of the question 'what happened at Boston?'¹¹ And so we find that instead of an intellectual development in the father-son relation, a meeting of all the relevant questions which the experiences in life pose, there is an absence of such a development. Because the intellectual development is blocked they simply cannot 'go on', project their way forward. Some questions in life can seem so intimidating that for many the only way to deal with them is to blot them out.

The illustrations from adult living make the point that life experiences and situations should spontaneously provoke our wonder, our capacity to question. The problems or investigations which those situations pose are again complexes of questions and answers. The answers will be presented to us by our understanding. The relevant sub-questions have to be allowed time to emerge in order to build up towards a resolution. Intellectual development in common sense living can again be a matter of living through a linked succession of such investigations. In this manner the individual as intellectual constructs his own intellectual history. The interconnections within it in time are quite complex for it does not unfold at all like a mathematical series within the life. Major intellectual interests and investigations, be they life, scientific, technological, business, or historical become the arteries, the highways so to speak, of lived experience as intellectual. Thus for Watson, resolving the question, 'what is a gene?'; for Biff Loman coming to terms with the experience of what happened in Boston; for Nora understanding 'what are my sacred duties?', become crucial chapters in their personal intellectual histories.

Through the accumulation of our experiences and of our questioning and coming to know objects in the world throughout our lives, we construct a personal mental history. It is comprehensive. It includes all our knowledge in different fields of

interest. It also includes the mastery and application of all our cognitive skills, our ability to question scientifically - to pose classical or statistical types of questions for instance, or to pose historical types of questions. Theories, doctrinal stances, personal and social creeds emerge within it, are tested against experience, replaced, revised, accepted, and eventually become a significant part of it. Our intellectual history is also incomplete, in process, a peculiar mixture of enlightenment and darkness. Although comprehensive there is no element of it to which at least in principle we do not have access through what Augustine termed, the marvellous faculty of memory.¹²

Earlier it was remarked that our own mental operations are not objects in our own common sense, scientific, or historical worlds. We cannot find them like friends, or stars, or events in history. Because of this they can be overlooked and many find it extremely difficult to get in touch with the reality of themselves as knowing subjects. To recover the main outlines of one's personal intellectual history must constitute an important step in offsetting that tendency to overlook the unavoidable involvement of our own mental operations in all that we come to know. It amounts to a forceful objectification of ourselves as knowing subjects in time. It is not however a totally subjective reality. Human knowing is unavoidably intentional; it makes objects in the world present to us. So we find in the written up autobiography of such a personal history a continued interplay between experiences, objects or situations which we wonder about and come to understand, DNA or Helmer for instance, and the mental operations which make the experiences and situations present to us as understood and known. Proportionate to the total temporal intellectual story of the knowing subject is his total objective horizon, the horizon of all the objects that he comes to know in the world. To recover one's intellectual history in a written up autobiography is also, unavoidably, to recover one's horizons and horizon changes.

II

Many would acknowledge that they perceive, imagine, wonder, and that through the unfolding of their wonder they come to know objects in the world. Puzzlement begins to arise with the recognition that terms such as imagining, remembering, wondering, suddenly understanding, thinking, speaking, criticising, and judging refer to human activities or operations that are also conscious. From the present standpoint consciousness is to be interpreted as a quality of specifically named mental operations such as imagining, questioning, and so forth. The invitation to self-appropriation involves make the conscious dimension of those mental operations an explicit field of questioning interest and concern. But those recurring mental operations are the unchanging, invariant, unrevisable basic notes which write the infinitely varied symphonies of everyone's personal intellectual history. It follows that to make the conscious dimension of mental operations a field of questioning attentiveness is to make some wider or narrower span of our intellectual histories in their conscious dimension an object of investigation.

As cognitive beings we are constituted not by a single type, but rather by many different types of mental operations. As they are distinct so there is a distinctiveness in their conscious qualities. The conscious awareness involved in puzzling out something or in suddenly grasping the point is quite different from that involved in looking or hearing. An important task in self-appropriation is facing the question, how familiar

am I with the conscious dimension of my own distinct mental activities? Just how clear am I on the kind of cognitive being I am? Here one is reminded of Darwin's remark about the geologist's reactions on first encountering a new geological region.¹³

Initially it appears chaotic. Only slowly as he begins to familiarise himself with it, and record his growing familiarity, do the various differentiations and patterns emerge.

The same hold true for the task of familiarising ourselves with the conscious dimension of problem solving as a given experience. It is an extremely strange realm, quite unlike anything we perceive in this world. In fact some elements in it, having insights - suddenly understanding and being able to go on, for instance, can be so elusive that much time might have to be spent persuading ourselves that we are in fact characterised by such mental experiences. For just as we can be inattentive to the data of sense, to events and situations in our world, and find as a consequence that our field of interest and mastery is full of blind spots, so also with respect to the data of consciousness. Many, on the other hand, would acknowledge that they see, hear, wonder, think, and judge. But most would find it difficult to describe what it is like to question, what it is like for a question to emerge in their experience, and how questioning differs from mere looking. So it cannot be acknowledged that we are necessarily in touch with the different kinds of mental activity, our intellectual history will be more fully interpreted. Again, remembering our intellectual history could draw our attention to different types of mental activity which we tend to overlook. This in turn prepares the way for the crucial question, are those different mental activities just so many unrelated 'atoms' of mental experience or do they stand in some pattern of interdependence?

As contrast aids clarity it will be helpful to compare the clarification of the conscious dimension of our mental operations sought in self-appropriation with alternative positions such as 'inner empiricism' or 'logical constructionism'. Inner empiricism acknowledges that there exists perceptual activities and states such as looking listening, touching, pleasure and pain, hunger and thirst, depression and elation, and so forth, which are accessible to 'inner sense' as colours and shapes and sounds are accessible to 'outer sense'. The occurrence of some number of such distinctive conscious experiences and states is taken as self-evident. All can experience, identify, and verify them. The occurrence of questioning, understanding, and thinking does not seem quire so self-evident. For wonder has neither colour nor shape, nor is it like looking or hearing. As such it does not seem accessible to inner sense. Similar considerations apply to suddenly understanding and thinking. It is concluded that if mental activities such as questioning suddenly understanding, and thinking are real and conscious then they must be simple complexifications or constructions out of and reducible to the more primitive and self-evident given conscious experiences. Equally the objects of wonder, understanding, and thought in the world must also be logical constructions or complexifications of and reducible to the objects of the more self-evident conscious activities. For to the naive realist of the outer and inner worlds what possible alternatives could exist?

To break with the naive positions of 'inner empiricism' or some form of 'constructionism' involves an element of conversion. It involves recognising a blind spot in one's horizon which is the result of serious inattentiveness to certain aspects of the performance of problem solving as conscious. Slowly to discover that one is constituted by mental operations such as wondering, suddenly understanding, thinking,

and judging, which, although not unrelated to looking and imagining are also qualitatively utterly different is to undergo a conversion, to change radically one's understanding of oneself. To become clear about the immense differences between looking and understanding on the one hand, and understanding and judging on the other is to achieve a very high degree of self-knowledge. Through such a conversion one begins to get in touch with some of the deepest realities about oneself as a human being, the reality of oneself as an incarnate spirit. To reject the invitation is to desire to stay in the dark about oneself.

This process of conversion is not a simple matter. There is involved in it something akin to a painful process of purification, and overcoming of the sensate epistemologist within. Augustine remarked that for years he had 'a gross mind'.¹⁴ By this he seems to mean that for him for years knowing something was a matter of taking a good look at it, and that what became known were simply 'bodies', out there now real.¹⁵ It took him a great amount of time and involved a considerable personal struggle and purification in order to discover the distinction between looking and understanding. Nor does there seem to be any short cut to such a conversion and it is never complete. Overcoming an innate naive realism about ourselves is a permanent task. Much of contemporary epistemology is in flight from it. It is the present position that a developing familiarity with the broad outlines of one's intellectual history will greatly assist it. As progress is made in differentiating looking from wondering, understanding and judging, it soon becomes clear that the things that exist in the world become known to us, not merely by seeing, hearing, touching or imagining them, but also through understanding and judging. Understanding and judging make present to us attributes of things quite different from their shapes or colours.

One goal of self-appropriation is to bring about a conversion in our self-understanding. A second goal is to work out a theory of human knowing as well as a theory of the structure of the objects in the world that become known to us.¹⁶ Coming to know something in the world involves the use of many distinct kinds of mental activities such as perceiving, remembering, imagining, wondering, suddenly understanding, thinking, speaking, criticising, and judging. As they are distinct qualitatively so they make qualitatively distinct attributes of the world present to us. Perceiving makes the shapes, sounds, and colours of things present to the knower. Through understanding there is made present various kinds of relations in the world, structural or functional relations for instance. There is grasped how the knower relates to people and things in his world, how things are related to one another, the probability distributions governing their frequencies of occurrence and the evolutionary laws which determine their emergence and survival.

But, it can be asked, is our perceiving and what we perceive utterly unrelated to our wonder, to our understanding, and to what we wonder about and understand? Much analysis of mental acts considers them in isolation from others. To understand the interrelations of the different qualitatively distinct mental activities involved in the performance of coming to know something in the world is to work out a theory of human knowing.¹⁷ To work out the corresponding relations between the attributes of the known objects in the world that become present to us through the distinct mental activities is to work out a theoretical ontology.¹⁸ As such the goal of the project is theoretical. On this level many can approach the theory of knowledge or theory ontology as they might approach a theory of the hydrogen atom or of a biological

organism. It is approached as a coherent system of terms and relations implicitly defined.¹⁹

There are, however, some basic differences involved in approaching those different theoretical systems. Firstly, one does not have to undergo a conversion in one's self-understanding in order to for the terms and relations of physics and chemistry to become meaningful. Secondly, all theories relate to data which they propose to explain. But the data from which the theory of knowledge derives and the evidence on which it stands or falls is present, not in the physical world, but only in the personal intellectual of any knower. It is really a theory about what is happening in that intellectual history. In verifying it one must appeal to some larger or smaller segment of it.

A theory of knowledge will then define the inter-relatedness of such terms as perceiving, looking, imaging, wondering and understanding, thinking, criticising and judging. As such it abstracts from the concrete life experiences, questions, insights, thoughts, etc., of the individual. But experiencing, understanding, and judging are also the names of cognitive operations which recur throughout the total life span or story of the individual knower. To talk about an act of looking or of understanding is to engage in severe abstraction. For the concrete reality of the knower is not any individual mental act but rather the total aggregate or story of his experiences, questions, insights, thoughts, utterances, judgements, and so forth, in other words, his intellectual history. The evidence on which any theory of knowledge stands or falls is given in the total intellectual history. The present argument would be that the more explicit this relation between the theory, and the data it proposes to explain is made, the better.

There would seem to be involved something of a double awakening. The first involves overcoming the taken for granted naive position that knowing something is a matter of taking a good look at it. It is an invitation to become familiar with mental operations significantly different from looking. The second awakening involves overcoming the way in which our intellectual history as tacitly composed is overlooked or taken for granted. Remembering it can greatly help us in the journey of self-appropriation. We can of course approach our intellectual history as naive realists discovering in it only conscious experiences such as looking or listening or touching or imagining. But any serious attempt at recovery of the story of one's problem solving must soon begin to undermine naive views on the nature of human consciousness. For problem solving is a much more complex and irreducible phenomena than that view proposes. As we make progress in differentiating the different conscious activities, our intellectual history will come to be interpreted in a quite different light. We will find ourselves remembering what it was like for some question to strike us, to emerge, at some time in the past. We will remember moments of insight, or moments when we had to admit our insights were wrong. On the other hand, as we recover our intellectual history it too can illuminate aspects of self-appropriation where we have yet work to do. So there can occur a two way interaction between the recovery of one's personal intellectual history and progress in self-appropriation.

The case that self-appropriation presupposes the existence of a personal intellectual history has been presented. It has further been suggested that a familiarity with the broad outlines of that history will be a help in getting in touch with the relevant data which poses the basic question. It will also aid progress in resolving it. Progoff's journaling techniques are general procedures designed to assist any individual to get in touch with the movement of his life. They are open in their orientation to the whole of the life story rather than to particular strands of it such as the intellectual. Because of their generality it can be tentatively suggested that they could be applied to the more specific task in hand, that objectifying one's intellectual history in a personal autobiography.

Human lived experience as intellectual is not qualitatively the same over time. To consider a parallel, in the course of a life or of periods of a life, out of the whole gamut of people which are encountered, some few stand out as much more significant than the rest. Similarly over the whole of a lifetime of an individual, or even during periods of that life, out of all possibilities certain 'life questions' or interests' emerge with a peculiar intensity. They could become major preoccupations, or like Kepler's grappling with the problem of explaining the orbit of Mars, even obsessions.²⁰ Those intellectual interests and the major questions in which they find their expression and focus, no less than significant personal encounters, shape the structure of our lifestory in time. Employing a category used by Progoff it can be suggested that lived experience as intellectual is constituted by Steppingstones and Steppingstone Periods.²¹ The periods are related to the experiences and interests and the major questions or investigations which focus them. Because of this the journaling techniques can be used in dealing with the task in hand. Some tentative suggestions follow.

A first task would be to locate the parameters of the present period of one's intellectual interests or investigations. We might begin by wondering - 'what are the dominant intellectual interests of the present period of my life?' A set of questions which help focus on the matter could be considered and the answers to them written up in a period log section:

1. What experiences in the present phase of one's intellectual history are raising what new or transformed old questions? What interests or perplexities in one's life is one attempting to navigate? When did the present period of one's intellectual history begin? What experiences, individuals, books, wisdom figures, etc. shaped it? Is one engaged in a general form of searching which has yet to be focused under the heading of one or more major questions? Has the present question yet to take shape? Is it in the realms of science or history? Is it very local and practical or is it some form of transpersonal question such as coming to terms with loneliness, friendship, love, conflict, death? Has one made any progress on the problem, got any clues, any partial insights. Can one identify the manner in which one's way forward is blocked until the problem is resolved? Can one remember periods of reflecting on the adequacy of one's present understanding of the issue? Has one found it to be mistaken? Finally is one avoiding some basic question at the present time and is the present period a shadow, a retreat, as a result?

Having located one's present intellectual standpoint there now arises the task of moving back into the past. So a second journaling task would be to find the

Steppingstones and Steppingstone Periods of one's intellectual autobiography. It can again be focused in a set of questions and the answers to them can be written up in the Steppingstone section of the journal:

2. What significant moments or experiences in the past can one remember in the unfolding of one's intellectual autobiography. Are they moments of being in the dark or of great enlightenment. What, for instance were the experiences which set the direction of one's intellectual interests which eventually became focused in research investigations or became framed in specific life questions. There comes to mind here a very dramatic illustration, the manner in which the voyage of the Beagle was a major turning point in Darwin's intellectual autobiography. The new experiences opened up to him by the voyage of the Beagle were a major turning point in Darwin's intellectual autobiography. The new experiences opened up to him by the voyage expanded his wonder and set the tone of his subsequent major work. What new experiences provoked what new questions, or what taken for granted experiences suddenly became the source of a problem. Were there moments when the significance of a question, which one might have heard repeated many times, struck one for the first time or in a new way. Were there moments when like Archimedes or Hamilton we cried out our own eureka's? Equally, were there moments when one discovered that one's beliefs, scientific doctrines, paradigms or world view were simply inadequate? Individuals as well as cultures can pass through a Copernican or Darwinian revolution.

Having located in one's intellectual story some major Steppingstones and Steppingstone periods, the next task is to fill them out, to explore them in greater detail. Answers to questions such as the following can again be written up in the Steppingstone section of the journal:

3. What individuals, teachers, wisdom figures, experiences in one's life at the time influenced the period. As Watson found himself reading again and again Pauling's *The Nature of the Chemical Bond*, so what major texts or philosophical classics did one find oneself reflecting upon? What individuals helped one to master the problem as a problem? What opposition or resistance did one notice in oneself or in one's social environment to the unfolding of the investigation? What elements of the data, behaviour etc., took on a new significance as the interests unfolded. Can one identify a time when the problem as problem was mastered? Can one remember the final stages of the resolution of the problem? Was one bored, frustrated, anxious to complete it and move on, or exhilarated?

Finally, the broad findings of the journaling of the different Steppingstone Periods can be brought together in an intellectual autobiography.²² That recovery could generate an image of oneself which could challenge naïve self-interpretations. As the image is built up so the question of self-appropriation could begin to 'take' in one's life.

On a first level of recovery the objects of the questioning interest in the various periods will be in one's world, people, situations, and data seeking a scientific explanation. On a second level one can begin to remember the story of the unfolding of the art-work of self-appropriation in one's own life. When, one might ask, did I cease taking my mind for granted? What were the steps involved in moving towards a grasp of the profound significance of human wonder? When did I clearly begin to acknowledge insights as a mental reality? How clear am I on the sort of attributes of

the world they make present, and so forth. Self-appropriation as story emerges within the personal intellectual history and more or less successfully integrates with it. As it is the story of our deepening familiarity with the conscious dimensions of our mental activities, so the techniques of process meditation which are concerned with helping us to get in touch with the data of consciousness, would be relevant to it. These tentative remarks suggest possible ways of employing journalling techniques in resolving philosophical problems.

Philosophy of mind, it has been suggested, tacitly presupposes that individuals have personal intellectual histories. The understanding of the nature of mind is in fact an emergence in such a history. It also makes certain claims about what is happening in the history. The nature of these presuppositions needs further clarification. That task of clarification will be assisted by the use of journalling techniques.

Finally, it might be objected that the argument throughout has focussed exclusively on the intellectual aspect of self-appropriation rather than on the moral, affective or religious. In principle, parallel reflections could be addressed to those other dimensions of the problem.

Notes.

1. W. Mathews, 'On Journaling Self-Appropriation', *Milltown Studies* (7) (1981), pps 96-134, especially 103-5.
2. Arthur Miller, *Death of a Salesman*, Penguin Plays 1976.
3. *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974, 5,632. See also Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (translated by N. K. Smith) London, Macmillan 1964, index under 'apperception, transcendental unity of' for further relevant material.
4. I am not unaware of the problems of self-identity and identification or of distinguishing between chronicle and narrative memory, all of which are associated with autobiography. But for present purposes I am simply adopting a somewhat common sense approach to what an autobiography is. There is also a problem of terminology. We can refer to history that is written as well as to the history that is written about. The latter is the referent of the former. Our intellectual history as given is the latter, as written up in an autobiography the former. The term 'intellectual history' was chosen in preference to 'intellectual story' or 'tacit intellectual autobiography'.
5. *Collected Papers II*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff 1976, 92f, 123f.
6. *Autobiography*, Oxford 1970, p.28.
7. *The Double Helix*, Penguin Books 1970, P.28.
8. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford, Blackwell's 1953, paragraphs 151, 153, 179, 323. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Oxford, Blackwell's 1967, P.188f.
9. Ibsen, *Plays*, Penguin classics 1976, 147f. In the first act Nora accepts, unquestioningly, the way in which Helmer relates to her. The second act prepares for the crisis which comes to a head in Act III, 220f, especially 224-7.
10. *Death of a Salesman*, 72-4.
11. *ibid.*
12. *The Confessions of Saint Augustine*, London, Sheed and Ward 1978., Book 10, Chapters VIII-XXV, pps. 172-188.
13. *The Autobiography of Charles Darwin and Selected Letters*, Francis Darwin (Editor), New York, Dover 1958, pps. 28-9.
14. *Confessions*, Book 7, Chapter 1, pps. 101-2.
15. *ibid.* Lonergan, *Insight, A Study of Human Understanding*, London, Longmans 1957, 250f.
16. On this see F. E. Crowe, *The Lonergan Enterprise*, Massachusetts, Cowley Publication 1980, 59-62.
17. *Insight*, 272-4, Chapter XI, Collection, London, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1966, 221f.
18. *Insight*, Chapter XV.
19. *ibid.*, 12-13, 392, 375, etc.
20. See Arthur Koestler, *The Sleepwalkers*, A Penguin Book 1964, Part Four, especially 307f.

21. Ira Progoff, *At a Journal Workshop*, New York, Dialogue House Library 1975, Chapters 8 and 9.
22. *ibid.* Chapter II.